Arnold Expedition
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
|
||||||
In September 1775, early in the American Revolutionary War, Benedict Arnold led a force of 1,100 Continental Army troops on an expedition through the wilderness of what is now Maine that was part of a two-pronged invasion of the British Province of Quebec. The other expedition, led by Richard Montgomery, invaded Quebec from Lake Champlain.
Arnold's expedition was a success in that he was able to bring a body of troops to the gates of Quebec City. However, the expedition was beset by troubles as soon as it left the last significant outposts of civilization in Maine. There were numerous difficult portages as the troops moved up the Kennebec River, and the boats they were using frequently leaked, spoiling gunpowder and food supplies. The height of land between the Kennebec and the Chaudière Rivers was a swampy tangle of lakes and streams, and the traversal was complicated by bad weather and inaccurate maps; more than one quarter of the troops turned back at this point. The descent down the Chaudière resulted in the destruction of more boats and supplies as the inexperienced troops were unable to control the boats in its fast-moving waters.
By the time Arnold reached the outskirts of civilization above the Saint Lawrence River in November, his force was reduced to 600 starving men. They traveled about 350 miles through untracked wilderness, twice the distance they expected to. This did not prevent Arnold's troops, with assistance from the local Canadiens, from reaching and then crossing the Saint Lawrence on November 13 and 14, and attempting to put Quebec City under siege. Failing in that effort, Arnold withdrew to Point-aux-Trembles until Montgomery arrived to lead an attack on the city.
[edit] Background
On May 10, 1775, shortly after the American Revolutionary War began, Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen led an expedition that captured Fort Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain in the British Province of New York.[1] Both Allen and Arnold were aware that Quebec was lightly defended; in fact, there were only about 600 regular troops in the entire province.[2] Arnold, who had done business in the province before the war,[3] had intelligence that the French-speaking Canadiens would be favorably disposed toward a Colonial force.[4]
Arnold and Allen each made arguments to the Second Continental Congress that Quebec could be taken from the British, and pointed out that the British could use Quebec as a staging area for attacks down Lake Champlain and into the Hudson River valley. At first, Congress, not wanting to alarm the people of Quebec, rejected these arguments,[5] but in July 1775, amid concerns that the British might use Quebec as a base for military movements into New York, they authorized an invasion of Quebec via Lake Champlain, and assigned the task to General Philip Schuyler of New York.[6]
[edit] Planning
Arnold, who had hoped to lead the invasion, decided to pursue a different approach to Quebec. He went to Cambridge, Massachusetts in early August 1775, and approached George Washington with the idea of a supporting eastern invasion force aimed at Quebec City.[7] Washington approved of the idea in principle, but he sent a message to General Schuyler on August 20 to ensure his support of the endeavour, as the two forces would need to coordinate their efforts.[8]
Arnold's plan called for the expedition to sail from Newburyport, Massachusetts up the Kennebec River to Fort Western (now Augusta, Maine). From there, they would use bateaux to continue up the Kennebec River, cross the height of land to Lake Mégantic, and descend the Chaudière River to Quebec.[9] Arnold expected to cover the 180 miles (290 km) from Fort Western to Quebec in 20 days,[10] in spite of the poorly-known properties of the route.[9] While Arnold had acquired a map (pictured at left) and journal made by British military engineer John Montresor in 1760 and 1761, Montresor's descriptions were not very detailed, and important details were deliberately removed or obscured in the copy Arnold possessed.[11]
Washington introduced Arnold to Reuben Colburn, a boat builder from Gardinerston, Maine, who was in Cambridge at the time. Colburn offered his services, and Arnold requested detailed information about the route, including potential British naval threats, Indian sentiment, useful supply opportunities, and an estimate of how long it would take to construct bateaux sufficient for the contemplated force. Colburn left for Maine on August 21 to fulfill these requests.[12]
Samuel Goodwin, the local surveyor in Gardinerston, was known by Colburn to have Loyalist sympathies. In response to Colburn's request, he provided maps that were notably incorrect in routes, distances and other important features. Arnold was also unaware that his copy of Montresor's older map was inaccurate.[13]
On September 2, Washington received a letter from General Schuyler in response to his August 20 message. Schuyler agreed with the suggested plan, so Washington and Arnold immediately set about raising troops and placing orders for supplies.[14]
[edit] Recruitment and preparations for departure
Because there had been little direct action at Boston after the Battle of Bunker Hill in June, many units were bored with garrison life and eager for action.[15] Arnold eventually selected a force of 750 men from the large number that volunteered.[16] Most of these were divided into two battalions, one commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Roger Enos and the other by Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Greene. The rest were placed in a third battalion under Daniel Morgan that also included 250 riflemen from Pennsylvania and Virginia.[17] These frontiersmen, from the Virginia and Pennsylvania wilderness, were better suited to wilderness combat than to a siege, and had been causing trouble since arriving outside Boston.[16] The entire force numbered about 1100.[18]
Washington and Arnold were concerned about Indian support (or opposition) to the effort, as well as the reception Arnold's forces might receive from the French-speaking Canadiens once they arrived near the Saint Lawrence River. On August 30, Washington wrote to General Schuyler of a meeting with an Abenaki chief, "He says the Indians of Canada in general, and also the French, are greatly in our favor, and determined not to act against us."[19] Four Abenakis accompanied the expedition as scouts and guides.[20]
[edit] Cambridge to Fort Western
The expedition began its departure from Cambridge on September 11, marching to Newburyport. The first units to leave were composed largely of men from that area, to whom Arnold had given extra time so that they would be able to see their families once more before the expedition left Newburyport. The last troops marched off on September 13, with Arnold riding from Cambridge to Newburyport on September 15 after making final purchases of supplies.[20]
On September 2, as soon as General Schuyler's agreement with the expedition was known, Arnold wrote a letter to Nathaniel Tracy, a merchant of his acquaintance in Newburyport. He asked Tracy to acquire sufficient shipping to transport the expedition to Maine without drawing attention to British ships patrolling the area. The sea voyage was viewed by both Arnold and Washington as the most dangerous part of the expedition; British patrols were highly effective at interfering with Colonial shipping at the time.[21]
Headwinds and fog delayed the departure of the expedition from Newburyport until September 19. In twelve hours, they reached the mouth of the Kennebec River. They spent the next two days negotiating the island channels near the mouth and sailing up the river.[22] Upon arriving in Gardinerston on the 22nd, they spent the next few days there, organizing supplies and preparing the boats they would use for the river portion of the trek.[23] In a portent of troubles to come, Arnold inspected Colburn's hastily-constructed bateaux, finding them to be "very badly built", and "smaller than the directions given".[24] Colburn and his crew spent the next three days building additional bateaux.[24]
Arnold's troop movements did not escape British notice. General Thomas Gage in Boston was aware that Arnold's troops were "gone to Canada and by way of Newburyport", but he believed the target to be Nova Scotia, which was at the time virtually undefended.[25] Francis Legge, the governor of Nova Scotia, declared martial law, and on October 17 sent a message to England laden with rumors about American actions that turned out to be false. Admiral Samuel Graves eventually received intelligence that the American troops "went up the Kennebec River, and 'tis generally believed are for Quebec".[26]
[edit] Scouting
As the troop transports arrived, Arnold dispatched some of them in the already-constructed bateaux up the Kennebec River ten miles (16 km) to Fort Western, and the others by foot on a track leading to Fort Halifax, 45 miles (72 km) up the Kennebec. While waiting for the bateaux construction to be completed, Arnold received word from scouts that Colburn had sent out to reconnoiter the proposed route. Their reports included rumors of a large Mohawk force near the southernmost French settlements on the Chaudière River, but the source of these rumors was Natanis, a Norridgewock believed to be spying for General Carleton, so Arnold discounted them.[24]
On September 24, Arnold sent out two small scouting groups. One, under Pennsylvanian Lieutenant Archibald Steele, was ordered to push as far as Lake Mégantic, with instructions to gather intelligence. The second, under Lieutenant Church, was to survey the route as far as the Dead River, at a place known to the local Indians as the Great Carrying Place, so that Arnold might better estimate how far the column would need to travel each day.[10]
[edit] Early signs of trouble
The full expedition set out from Fort Western on September 25.[27] Divided into three groups, the riflemen led the way, blazing trails when needed. Colburn and a crew of boatwrights came in the rear, to repair bateaux as needed.[28] The first group traveled relatively lightly, as they would be working to make the trail, while the last group, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Enos, carried the bulk of the supplies. Arnold may have chosen Enos to bring up the rear due to his experience in the French and Indian War.[29]
The expedition arrived at its first target, Fort Halifax, a decaying relic of the French and Indian War, on the second day. There was a rough track from Fort Western, so some of the men and supplies had moved overland rather than in the bateaux that had to be portaged around the falls above Fort Western to begin the trip.[30] Arnold, rather than traveling in one of the heavier bateaux, traveled in a lighter canoe, so that he might move more rapidly among the troops along the travel route.[29]
Arnold reached Norridgewock Falls, location of the last settlements on the Kennebec, on October 2. Even at this early date, problems were apparent. The bateaux were leaking, resulting in spoiled food and the constant need for repairs. The men were constantly wet, due to the leakage as well as the frequent need to pull the heavy boats upstream. As temperatures began to drop below freezing, colds and dysentery set in, reducing the effectiveness of the force.[31]
The portage around Norridgewock Falls, a distance of about one mile, was accomplished with the assistance of oxen provided by the local settlers, but it took almost a week to complete; Arnold did not depart from there until October 9. Colburn's crew devoted some of this time to making repairs on the bateaux.[32] Most of the expedition reached the Great Carrying Place on October 11, and Arnold arrived the next day. This stretch of the trek was complicated by heavy rains, rendering the portages difficult due to extremely muddy conditions.[33]
[edit] The Great Carrying Place
The Great Carrying Place was a portage of roughly twelve miles (19 km), bypassing an unnavigable section of the Dead River, the tributary of the Kennebec the expedition was to follow. The portage included a rise in elevation of about 1,000 feet (305 m) to the high points of the carry and the three ponds.[34] Lieutenant Church, the leader of the survey team, described the route as a "bad road but capable of being made good", an assessment that turned out to be somewhat optimistic.[35]
The vanguard of the main body, led by Daniel Morgan, met Lt. Steele's advance scouting party en route to the first pond.[36] This party had successfully scouted the route to the height of land above the Dead River, but the men were near starvation as their supplies had been depleted, and they were largely subsisting on a protein-rich diet of fish, moose, and duck.[37] Most of the men continued to partake of the local wildlife to supplement their meager supplies as the expedition continued.[35]
Church, in his description of the route, had failed to account for the heavy rains and the generally boggy conditions between the first and second ponds. Rain and snow harassed the men during the long portage, and a falling tree killed a man, the expedition's first casualty. Some of the men who drank the brackish waters along the way became violently ill, forcing Arnold to order construction of a shelter at the second pond as cover for the sick, and to send some men back to Fort Halifax for supplies that had been cached there.[38]
The first two divisions finally reached the Dead River on October 13, with Arnold arriving three days later. At this point, Arnold wrote a number of letters, including several that were intercepted and turned over to Quebec's Lieutenant Governor Cramahé, giving Quebec its first notice that the expedition was on its way.[39] He also dispatched the survey team again, this time to mark the trail all the way to Lake Mégantic.[40]
[edit] Disaster on the Dead River
Progress up the Dead River was extremely slow. Contrary to its name (which supposedly described the speed of its currents), the river was flowing rapidly enough that the men had trouble rowing and poling against the current. The leaky boats spoiled more of the food, forcing Arnold to put everyone on half rations. Then, on October 19, the skies opened, pouring rain, and the river began to rise. Early on October 22, the men awoke to discover that the river had risen to their level, and they had to scramble to even higher ground for safety. When the sun rose they were surrounded by water.[41]
After spending most of that day drying out, the expedition set off on October 23, only to be forced to a halt by a significant accident. A party of men had, due to misperceptions caused by the swollen river, mistakenly turned up one of its branches. When returning from this mistake, seven bateaux overturned, spoiling their remaining supplies. Arnold called a council of the officers nearby, which did not include either Colonel Greene or Colonel Enos, the leaders of the two rear divisions, and those carrying the bulk of the expedition's dwindling supplies. This council decided to pick an advance party that would proceed as rapidly as possible to civilization on the Chaudière, and work to bring supplies back. The sick and infirm were to retreat to civilization in Maine.[42]
Colonel Greene and his men were starving. They had little flour, and were consuming candle wax and shoe leather to supplement their minimal rations. On October 24, Greene attempted to catch up with Arnold, but was unable to do so, as Arnold had moved too far ahead. When he returned to his camp, Colonel Enos had arrived, and they held another council. Enos' captains were united in wanting to turn back, in spite of Arnold last orders, which were to press ahead. In the council, Enos cast a tie-breaking vote in favor of continuing, but in a meeting with his captains after the council, announced that because they were set on returning, he was acceding to their decision, and would return. After giving Greene's men some of his supplies, Enos and 450 men turned back.[43]
[edit] Searching for Lake Mégantic
The inaccurate maps the expedition began to take their toll when the expedition crossed the height of land.[44] Portions of the advance party became lost in swampy bogs that were not on those maps, resulting in delays reaching Lake Mégantic. While this part of the party crossed the height of land on October 25, it was not until two days later that they reached the lake.[45] On October 28, the advance party descended the upper Chaudière, destroying three of their bateaux when they turned over and crashed into rocks above some falls on the river. The next day they encountered several Penobscot Indians, who confirmed that they were not far from Sartigan, the first outpost of civilization in Quebec.[46]
Arnold, when he reached Lake Mégantic, sent a man back to the two remaining divisions of the expedition with instructions on how to navigate the swampy lands above the lake. Unfortunately, due to errors in how Arnold described the way (since he was relying on the incorrect maps),[47] some elements of those divisions spent two days lost in those swamps before the majority finally reached the falls on the upper Chaudière on October 31.[48] Along the way, they ate Henry Dearborn's dog. Dearborn recorded the event in his diary, writing that they "[ate] every part of him, not excepting his entrails; and after finishing their meal, they collected the bones and carried them to be pounded up, and to make broth for another meal."[49]
[edit] Arrival at Quebec
Arnold began made contact with the French-speaking Canadiens living in the area on October 30. The locals, sympathetic to his plight, supplied provisions and cared for the sick; some were well paid for their aid, while others refused payment.[50][51] Arnold distributed copies of a letter written by Washington asking the habitants to assist the expedition, and Arnold added promises to respect the persons, property, and religion of the locals. Jacques Parent, a Canadien from Pointe-Levi, notified Arnold that Lieutenant Governor Cramahé had ordered the destruction of all boats on the southern banks of the Saint Lawrence after receiving intercepted communications.[50]
On November 9 the expedition finally reached Pointe-Levi; Arnold had about 600 of his original 1,100 men.[52] From John Halstead, a New Jersey-born businessman who operated a mill near Pointe-Levi, Arnold learned of the arrest of his courier and the interception of some of his letters. Halstead's mill became the organizing point for the crossing of the Saint Lawrence. Some of Arnold's men purchased canoes from the habitants and the local Saint Francis Indians, and then transported them from the Chaudière to the mill site.[53] The forces crossed the St. Lawrence on the night of November 13–14 after three days of bad weather, likely crossing the mile-wide river between HMS Hunter and HMS Lizard, two ships that were guarding the river against such a crossing.[54]
The city of Quebec was then defended by about 150 men of the Royal Highland Emigrants under Lieutenant Colonel Allen Maclean, supported by about 500 poorly organized local militia and 400 marines from the two warships.[55] When Arnold and his troops finally reached the Plains of Abraham on November 14, Arnold sent a negotiator with a white flag to demand their surrender, to no avail. The Americans, with no cannons or other field artillery, and barely fit for action, faced a fortified city. Arnold, after hearing rumors of a planned sortie from the city, decided on November 19 to withdraw to Pointe-aux-Trembles to wait for Montgomery, who had recently captured Montreal.[56]
[edit] Aftermath
The journey turned out to be 350 miles (560 km), not the 180 that Arnold and Washington had thought it would be.[57]
When Montgomery arrived at Pointe-Aux-Trembles on December 3, the combined force returned to the city and began a siege, finally assaulting it on December 31.[58] The battle was a devastating loss for the Americans; Montgomery was killed, Arnold was wounded, and Daniel Morgan was captured along with more than 350 men.[59] The invasion ended with a retreat back to Fort Ticonderoga, Montgomery's starting point, during the summer and early fall of 1776. Arnold, who commanded the army's rear in the later stages of the retreat, was able to delay the British advance sufficiently to prevent them from attempting the capture of Ticonderoga until 1777, in John Burgoyne's Saratoga campaign.[60]
Lieutenant Colonel Roger Enos and his detachment arrived back in Cambridge late in November. Enos was promptly court-martialed, charged with "quitting his commanding officer without leave".[61] He was acquitted, but was not treated well in camp. He resigned his commission shortly thereafter, and saw no more service in the war.[62]
[edit] Legacy
A number of geographic features along the route of the expedition bear names related to the expedition. East Carry Pond, Middle Carry Pond, and West Carry Pond, are all on the route of the portage at the Great Carrying Place, which is in the Carrying Place Town Township [sic] of Maine.[63] Arnold Pond is the last pond on the Dead River before crossing the height of land.[64]
[edit] Notes
- ^ Desjardin (2006), p. 9
- ^ Stanley (1973), p. 29
- ^ Desjardin (2006), p. 8
- ^ Desjardin (2006), p. 11
- ^ Smith (1907), p. 237
- ^ Smith (1907), pp. 241–242
- ^ Smith (1907), pp. 398–399
- ^ Martin (1997), pp. 108–109
- ^ a b Randall (1990), pp. 151–152
- ^ a b Martin (1997), p. 121
- ^ Smith (1903), p. 17
- ^ Desjardin (2006), p. 13
- ^ Randall (1990), p. 152
- ^ Randall (1990), pp. 147–150
- ^ Smith (1907), pp. 506–507
- ^ a b Randall (1990), p. 150
- ^ Desjardin (2006), pp. 16–17
- ^ Smith (1903), pp. 22,57
- ^ Desjardin (2006), p. 14
- ^ a b Martin (1997), p. 116
- ^ Randall (1990), p. 151
- ^ Martin (1997), p. 119
- ^ Smith (1903), pp. 58–83
- ^ a b c Martin (1997), p. 120
- ^ Randall (1990), p. 159
- ^ Randall (1990), p. 160
- ^ Smith (1907), p. 531
- ^ Desjardins (2006), p. 55
- ^ a b Martin (1997), p. 122
- ^ Desjardins (2006), p. 57
- ^ Martin (1997), pp. 123–124
- ^ Smith (1903), p. 109
- ^ Desjardins (2006), pp. 63–64
- ^ Desjardins (2006), p. 68
- ^ a b Martin (1997), p. 125
- ^ Desjardins (2006), p. 48
- ^ Desjardins (2006), pp. 31–48
- ^ Martin (1997), pp. 125–126
- ^ Martin (1997), pp. 126–127
- ^ Smith (1903), p. 131
- ^ Martin (1997), p. 127
- ^ Martin (1997), pp. 130–131
- ^ Desjardins (2006), pp. 80–81
- ^ Smith (1903), pp. 4–23
- ^ Martin (1997), pp. 134–135
- ^ Martin (1997), p. 136
- ^ Desjardins (2006), p. 90
- ^ Martin (1997), pp. 137–138
- ^ Desjardins (2006), p. 99
- ^ a b Lanctot (1967), pp. 97–98
- ^ Desjardins (2006), p. 112
- ^ Smith (1907), p. 152
- ^ Desjardins (2006), p. 128
- ^ Smith (1903), pp. 251–255
- ^ Alden (1969), p. 205
- ^ Thayer (1867), p. xiv
- ^ Smith (1903), p 231
- ^ Stanley (1973), pp. 88–95
- ^ Stanley (1973), p. 104
- ^ Stanley (1973), pp. 139–144
- ^ Randall (1990), pp. 179–180
- ^ Randall (1990), p. 180
- ^ Desjardins (2006), p. 33
- ^ Desjardins (2006), p. 38
[edit] References
- Alden, John R (1969). A history of the American Revolution. New York: Knopf. ISBN 0-306-80366-6. OCLC 19846752.
- Desjardin, Thomas A (2006). Through a Howling Wilderness: Benedict Arnold's March to Quebec, 1775. New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 0-312-33904-6.
- Kingsford, William (1892). The History of Canada, Volume 5. Toronto: Roswell & Hutchinson. OCLC 3676642. http://books.google.com/books?id=XspYAAAAMAAJ.
- Lanctot, Gustave (1967). Canada and the American Revolution 1774–1783. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. OCLC 70781264.
- Martin, James Kirby (1997). Benedict Arnold: Revolutionary Hero (An American Warrior Reconsidered). New York University Press. ISBN 0-8147-5560-7.
- Randall, Willard Sterne (1990). Benedict Arnold: Patriot and Traitor. New York: William Morrow. ISBN 1-55710-034-9. OCLC 21163135.
- Smith, Justin H (1903). Arnold's March from Cambridge to Quebec. New York: G. P. Putnams Sons. OCLC 1013608. http://books.google.com/books?id=vlU06ifA9ZEC. This book includes a reprint of Arnold's diary of his march.
- Smith, Justin H (1907). Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony, vol 1. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons. ISBN 9780306706332. OCLC 969701. http://books.google.com/books?id=Ls9BAAAAIAAJ.
- Stanley, George F. G. (1973). Canada Invaded 1775-1776. Toronto: A.M. Hakkert. ISBN 0-88866-537-7. OCLC 865341.
- Thayer, Simeon; Stone, Edwin Martin; Edwards, Morgan;Rhode Island Historical Society (1867). The Invasion of Canada in 1775: Including the Journal of Captain Simeon Thayer, Describing the Perils and Sufferings of the Army Under Colonel Benedict Arnold, in Its March Through the Wilderness to Quebec. Providence: Anthony Knowles. OCLC 1013566. http://books.google.com/books?id=afcLAAAAYAAJ.
[edit] Further reading
- Bird, Harrison (1968). Attack on Quebec. New York: Oxford University Press. OCLC 440055.
- Codman, John (1902). Arnold's Expedition to Quebec. New York. OCLC 1388869. http://books.google.com/books?id=DuRCAAAAIAAJ.
- Hatch, Robert McConnell (1979). Thrust for Canada: The American Attempt on Quebec in 1775–1776. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. ISBN 0-395-27612-8. OCLC 4983081.
- Roberts, Kenneth Lewis (1938). March to Quebec: Journals of the Members of Arnold's Expedition. New York: Doubleday & Doran. OCLC 426001.
- Smith, Justin H (1907). Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony, vol 2. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons. ISBN 9780306706332. OCLC 969701. http://books.google.com/books?id=19VBAAAAIAAJ.

