Moderate realism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Moderate realism as a position in the debate on the metaphysics of universals holds that there is no realm in which universals exist (against platonism, nor do they really exist within the individuals as universals, but rather universals really exist within the particulars as individualised, and multiplied. They exist as universals only as objects of our intellect, due to abstraction.
It is opposed to both full-blooded realism, such as the theory of Platonic forms, and nominalism. Nominalists deny the existence of universals altogether, even as individualised and multiplied within the individuals.
Aristotle espoused a form of moderate realism.
[edit] See also
- Abstract object
- Nominalism
- Object (philosophy)
- Platonic form
- Universal (metaphysics)
- realism (philosophy)
- perspectivism
